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Thank you very much for allowing me to be here. It is a privilege
to come back to the Duke University School of Law. It was an
enormous privilege to be here as a student many years ago and, of
course, the law school is an even better law school now than it was
then because of, among other things, the increase in size of faculty
and the continuing evolution of faculty quality. I was very glad that
they allowed me to attend law school here back when that happened,
and I feel even more privileged to be here now. Thank you for
permitting me to provide a few remarks.
I think it is interesting to go back to 1787 and 1861 and to talk a
little bit about certain former presidents of the United States, which
backward step into the historical record actually is not as irrelevant as
it might seem. In my time at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB) of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), we thought and
talked often about President Abraham Lincoln, and only from time to
time about Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. But
Jefferson and Madison, like Lincoln, are relevant to patent
discussions, generally, and to our discussion at this symposium.
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Jefferson and Madison are the presidents who, among their
pursuits, spent a considerable amount of time talking about costbenefit analysis in the context of patents. In fact, cost-benefit
analysis—which is one of the principal subjects of this symposium—is
1
at the very core of their letter correspondence on the subject of
patents, which correspondence mainly took place during the
formation of the Constitution, and then, thereafter, as part of their
discussion relating to the first patent legislation. A quick look back at
what they said helps frame some of the context to better understand
the cost-benefit-analysis discussion going on currently.
But let me go to President Lincoln first, who is perhaps a little
less germane to some of the discussion from today, but whose
engagement with the patent system also contributes to the notion of a
patent-system exceptionalism that always has existed and still is in
evidence today, as can be seen in the existence and relevance of the
PTAB.
President Lincoln is quite appropriately in the league with
Jefferson and Madison as a candidate for the title of the “Patent
President.” Among other things, he is the only president who actually
had a patent issued in his name, being himself an inventor. He is also
the president who really formed what today has become the PTAB.
2
In 1861, he followed through on an Act of Congress that had been
passed at the end of the administration of the President James
Buchanan in the fall of 1860, which Act called for some number of
people, three in particular, to review actions of the Patent Office and,
possibly, to enter reversals of decisions by the Patent Office. It is that
three-person board, then formed, which evolved over the course of
some 152 or 153 years into what, today, is the PTAB. Eventually,
from that group of reviewers, there came to be a Board of Appeals to
which disappointed patent applicants could appeal, and then, later,
there also came to be a Board of Interferences, which heard contests
between patentees disputing ownership of the same inventions. At a
point in time, those two Boards merged to form the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, which Congress later transformed, under
the America Invents Act of 2011, into the PTAB. That is the tribunal

1. See Robert Thibadeau, Thomas Jefferson and Intellectual Property including Copyrights
and Patents, SATURDAY AFTERNOON ADVENTURES ON THE INTERNET (Aug. 28, 2004),
http://rack1.ul.cs.cmu.edu/jefferson [http://perma.cc/HPT3-FEJU].
2. Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, § 3, 12 Stat. 246, 246–47.
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I had the pleasure of leading for four and a half years and which
Board we have spent time discussing today.
One might be disposed to think that the discussion today reflects
some special and new emergence of the importance of the review of
Patent Office decisions, but that would not be an appropriate
conclusion. It is not altogether new that we would stop to observe the
unique importance of a tribunal operating in the patent space in the
way that the PTAB does. To put the seeming novelty in truer context,
when President Lincoln appointed the first three reviewers to serve as
a board of review for decisions by Patent Office Examiners, it was,
more specifically, in March of 1861. March 1861 is when he began the
consideration of the candidates for appointment to the Board, and my
understanding is that he made the appointments starting in April of
1861.
Those of you versed in U.S. history will recall that those are the
very same months in which President Lincoln was giving thought as to
how to handle the situation at Fort Sumter, the fort in South Carolina
under siege or about to be under siege by the states in rebellion. Such
weighty matters as the siege in South Carolina being on his plate,
Lincoln nonetheless gave committed attention to the issue of the
operation of this new type of patent tribunal. That is, the patent
matters, or shall we say the “pre-PTAB patent matters” apparently
received an amount and even, possibly, a depth of thought right
alongside the consideration being given to the issue of the possible
breakup of the United States. I find it amazing to think that these
particular patent matters would receive such presidential attention;
and I am willing to suggest that the giving of this level of presidential
attention is demonstrative of patent matters having a history of at
least some exceptional treatment.
Nor was Lincoln’s contemplation of the patent system and how it
might improve through the operation of a group of reviewers serving
as an appellate tribunal merely one that he took on at arm’s length, as
a chief executive looking at another agency among the many within
the national government. His appointment to the position as the
chairman of that Board was that of a lawyer by the name of George
Harding, with whom Abraham Lincoln actually had tried a patent
case. Thus, his involvement with the overall process was not one of
disinterested executive oversight, but a reach into his own personal
involvement in the patent space and from his time in patent litigation.
This personal experience and engagement prompted Lincoln to his
particular choice of the person to lead the patent-appeal function.
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But President Lincoln is perhaps not the most relevant president
to some of the ideas that have been raised in the symposium today.
He is certainly the most relevant to the PTAB itself, but not to other
issues such as, for example, cost-benefit analysis, and the assessments
we might undertake of work output and levels of scrutiny used by
different “cohorts” of patent examiners.
You will recall that, when the Constitution of the United States
was being hammered out, and somewhat contrary to most people’s
recollection of the history of the situation, Thomas Jefferson was not
in the United States and not a regular participant in those discussions.
Rather, Jefferson’s participation in those discussions took place by
way of correspondence through James Madison, who was very
intimately involved in the process and, of course, here in the United
States. Thomas Jefferson was in Paris and in other parts of France,
serving a brief period as one of this young country’s emissaries to that
much older country.
Please note here that my implicit ratification in my remarks of
Thomas Jefferson as a Patent Demigod, whose guidance I firmly
believe we do well to embrace, is made notwithstanding my true
appreciation of deep flaws in Jefferson’s thoughts and actions.
First, let us observe that, when Jefferson was in France, he was
not there alone. He was there with, among other people, a young lady
by the name of Sally Hemings, whom history has treated quite
unfairly. We think often of Michelle Obama as being the first African
American First Lady, which she really is not. She is second on that
list, after Sally Hemings. When Jefferson had returned to the United
States and become president, his relationship with Sally Hemings had
expanded and deepened about as much as had his relationship with
the United States. In fact, one only need consult the birth records of
the Jefferson-Hemings children to see that when Jefferson was not in
Washington but in Charlottesville, there was no shortage of
interaction between Jefferson and Sally Hemings. She was most
certainly, in all his presidential years, the person with whom Jefferson
lived when not in Washington, his companion, and his partner in
procreation and other domestic endeavors. Accordingly, if assessing
such things as we do normally, it is hard not to concede that she was
early to the role as “significant other” of the president, second in time
only to the likes of Martha Washington and Abigail Adams.
If we are able to set aside Jefferson’s big misdeeds—that of
hiding Sally Hemings from the public and of allowing their joint
offspring to be slaves—we still might find ourselves quite fond of
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Thomas Jefferson. His contributions to the patent system are truly
enormous not only because of his early thoughts and guidance as to
the role patents could and eventually did play in a vibrant national
economy, but also because he helped—after he was back in this
country, and after the Constitution was in place—to hammer out the
3
first Patent Acts, which really made the patent system manifest itself
quite effectively in the United States. And his legislative involvement
is only one of his post-Constitution contributions, another one of
them being his quite deep and seminal involvement in the patent
system as, effectively, the first U.S. Commissioner of Patents.
Going back, however, to the constitutional period and
Jefferson’s discussions with Madison, you will remember that the
most fundamental part of their discussion really centered on this one
essential issue: Are the benefits of patents really worth their
tremendous cost? And Jefferson particularly is noted for having
emphasized how high the cost is of granting a monopoly, because
monopolies—particularly monopolies on ideas and inventions—are
truly expensive things for which everyone bears the cost. Accordingly,
his predisposition was that patent monopolies should be avoided,
indeed, that they not be granted.
But Jefferson was persuaded in the dialogue with Madison, who
more often took the other side of that debate; namely, that although
the cost of monopoly is high, the advantages of monopoly—as reward
for invention—are themselves quite high, sufficiently so that we
should consent to suffer the cost to the public.
On the subject of cost-benefit analysis in the context of this
4
symposium’s papers, one issue perhaps worthy of more discussion
involves the additional, and usually ignored, benefit inuring directly,
but counterintuitively, to the public from blocking the practice of a
patented invention. Specifically, once there is innovation moving
forward through any particular technological channel, the common
first reaction is to think that it is necessarily a bad thing for those
other than the patentee not to be allowed to proceed down that same
channel of innovation. But one of the not-so-often-discussed benefits
to the public that arises has to do precisely with that blocking of a
particular channel of innovation with a patent. That prohibition
forces innovation in other channels, those channels themselves
possibly yielding equally beneficial innovation, or possibly yielding
3. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
4. See Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE L.J. 1699 (2016).
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innovation which ultimately spurs even more profound
breakthroughs than those advancements that would have been
brought about had that blocked channel been open.
Generally, I suspect that were Jefferson’s and Madison’s eyes,
again, to be on the calculus of benefits and costs involved in
constructing a system for rewarding innovation, and were they to be
thinking of the added complexity that characterizes technology and
economics in modern times as compared with the state of those things
in the late 1700s, they would be somewhat surprised if, in the current
day, we did not find ourselves still somewhat intimidated and
perplexed by the daunting task of the cost-benefit analysis associated
with patents, because so much of what that involves touches on things
which perhaps are not truly quantifiable. For example, how exactly
does one measure how much money it takes to move someone into
his garage for years at a time, to battle upstream against doubt and
bad economics, to work through some innovation that, in the end,
might or might not transform society? The incentive structure and the
types of rewards that really move invention forward probably require
continuing study, as we look at and evolve the regulations around
patenting. Meanwhile, it is perhaps appropriate to recognize a certain
amount of the imponderable as to what invention is and how the
opportunities for reward actually move human beings.
Another subject covered by the symposium papers is how to
evaluate the performance of groups or “cohorts” of patent examiners,
5
and the actual standard of patentability they apply in their work. Few
subjects could be more Jeffersonian. In fact, Jefferson, by himself,
formed the first cohort of examiners because he was the first
examiner. Subsequently, he was part of the first group of examiners,
which he selected, presumably with at least some input from George
Washington.
The record appears to reveal that, during Jefferson’s time in the
role of examiner, he had changes in his view as to how much
examination scrutiny should be applied in reviewing patent
applications, deciding in the first instance that very intensive scrutiny
should be applied to every application. This resulted in the grant of
only as few as half a dozen or so patents in any one year. Later, it
appears that, because of an onslaught of possibly as many as one
hundred patent applications in a single year, it was decided that the
5. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J.
1599 (2016).
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standard of scrutiny should be adjusted. Throughout these various
periods of time during which the scrutiny level changed, Jefferson was
involving different individuals in the process, thus creating additional,
different sets of examiner cohorts who worked together, through
successive regimes of training and decisionmaking to provide the
country a body of patents. Accordingly, the national patent estate at
any given time in that era (as is true in the current era) was the direct
result of whatever decisions they had been making as to how they
should equip themselves to carry out the examination duties and how
stringent the process should be. It would be interesting to apply
today’s analytical methods, if we could, to understand more precisely
the impacts of the changes they made in the patent era in which they
made those changes.
The symposium also addresses the subjects of the appropriate
level of deference to give to decisionmakers in Executive Branch
6
agencies and the appropriateness of stacking judges on trial and
appellate panels—topics which also resonate with the issues present
in the days of Jefferson and Madison. They may not have confronted
such issues in the patent context specifically, but they dealt with them
in other contexts, leaving us with their views on those subjects, and
thus allowing us to apply those views—if we so desire and are able to
do so—in the patent field also. Looking at deference, there is one
kind of deference I particularly hope PTAB decisions will receive. I
always hope there will be occasion to see in the mindset brought to
the review of the PTAB’s decisions a predisposition of respect—one
which possibly would be both unintended and never expressly
articulated—which is to say a kind of invisible deference that is never
unfair to appellants—a deference grounded on the routinely highquality reasoning and exposition to be found in PTAB decisions.
It is important to look at the structure of review, how the law
frames around the different arms of government and how they are
called to undertake adjudicatory review of an agency’s work. And it is
important to follow the law as to such matters. A grounding in
common sense and practicality also is important. The comment has
been made in the context of standards of review, that, after a person
gets past the standards-of-review question, standards of review not
being unimportant, there is the question: “How good is your case
anyway, no matter what the standard of review is?” Similarly in the
6. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent
Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2016).
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context of deference, it might be appropriate to conclude that, as one
7
deals with issues such as Chevron deference, there is this
fundamental question about the decision made by an agency tribunal:
When you look at the decision itself, do you think the tribunal got it
right? I think a tribunal that is seen as routinely making correct
decisions necessarily will have an advantage, however hidden, in the
discussion as to whether or not it should be afforded deference
formally.
I also wanted to address, briefly, the subject of the PTAB as a
“first mover” or as a “prime mover” in the part of the system where
adjudicated decisions drive developments in the making of, or at least
8
in the interpretation of, patent law. I think one thing that should be
clear is that, if we were to make a diagram of the patent system—one
that includes the PTAB as a part of the system, we would see the
PTAB generating outputs and also receiving inputs from other parts
of the system. Some of those inputs come to the PTAB as outputs
from other parts of the system, most notably, in the form of binding
decisions from the U.S Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. And
the inputs include decisions from district courts when, for example,
those courts reach conclusions as to the interpretation of patent
claims. Such interpretations may usefully inform claim-interpretation
decisions being made by the PTAB on the patent claims when those
same claims are the subject of parallel litigation involving the same
patent, even when those district court claim-interpretation decisions
are not binding on the PTAB.
Our diagram also would show that the various inputs arriving at
the PTAB are sometimes “first-instance inputs” not already bearing
some input from the PTAB, including for example Federal Circuit
decisions in cases arising from district courts and with no part of the
matter having been adjudicated by the PTAB. The inputs also may be
“feedback inputs,” being in the nature of feedback because, for
example, they result from decisions by the Federal Circuit coming
about from appeals of PTAB decisions, which Federal Circuit
decisions then arrive back at the PTAB. Having so arrived, the
Federal Circuit decisions might constitute general guidance for all
future PTAB cases on given issues or, possibly, remand instructions
for a particular case.
7. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
8. See John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE
L.J. 1655 (2016).
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Once the system is providing inputs to the PTAB, which are
coming as first-instance inputs and as feedback inputs, the question
well might be asked which part of the system is operating first or as
the “prime operator” in causing evolution in patent law. Should
movement in the system or in the evolution of the system be seen as
beginning in a particular part of the system (that is, at the PTAB), or
as beginning with the feedback that was provided into that part of the
system (that is, with a decision from the Federal Circuit that was
appealed from the PTAB and then went back to the PTAB)? Does
the evolution of the patent system and patent law begin with a
decision or the review of the decision? It could be argued that the
movement of the system can come about as much from the early and
forthright introduction of a new approach to issues by a lower
tribunal as from the final adjudication by a higher court of a case in
which the new approach has been advanced.
Many parts of the administrative estate in “patent world” impact
what we see as “outputs” and influence what decisions are made and
how they are made, but I think there is something to be said for any
agency that can act well and quickly to help define the space it
regulates and determine an effective state of affairs. The PTAB has
an advantage in this regard because in all its trial matters the law
requires it to act quickly, including by rendering final decisions in
trials in no more than 365 days after the adjudicative process in an
inter partes matter begins.
As a practical example of an area in which we might see how the
PTAB could be the prime mover in defining the regime that exists, let
us consider the example of claim interpretation, and the question as
to which one of several tribunals could be most impactful as to what
patent claims mean. This question arises in the context of the more
general discussion as to the use of the “broadest reasonable
interpretation” standard, which is the current PTAB approach for
interpreting patent claims. The broadest reasonable interpretation
exists in contrast to “district court interpretation,” which is not
intended to provide the broadest interpretation, but a possibly
narrower interpretation of patent claim language more aimed at
preserving the validity of patent claims.
Let me divert only momentarily to say this—it is important,
when considering these two standards, also to ask this question: How
big a difference is there between the two approaches, practically
speaking? Many people will tell you that in 80 to 90 percent of the
instances they see, the difference between broadest reasonable
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interpretation and the Phillips or district-court standard is
inconsequential. And then, in the remaining 10 or 20 percent, the
debate has to do with whether there is a difference and, if so, whether
the degree of difference is significant?
In any event, notwithstanding whatever good reasons that may
have caused the Patent Office to decide to have a regulation in favor
of broadest reasonable interpretation for deciphering claim language
in PTAB trials, and with that operating as a possible point of unique
and outcome-determinative influence for the Patent Office, I am very
much of the view that a switch to the district-court standard actually
would enhance the power of the PTAB, causing its decisions to
deliver even more upfront impact in the system. That is, its role as
10
first or prime mover would be enhanced. Because, by statute, the
PTAB nearly always acts most quickly in the context of patent
trials—by always having aggressive discovery, briefing, and trial
schedules—if the PTAB used the same claim-interpretation standard
as district courts, the PTAB very often would be the first tribunal
deciding any issue of claim interpretation, which issue might arise,
again, at another tribunal, such as a district court. And, having
decided the claim-interpretation issues first, and probably often
without later contradiction by a court, the PTAB decisions will set the
direction of claim interpretation based on the primacy that results
from acting first. At a minimum, even if another tribunal—for
example, a district court—were to pick up a related claiminterpretation issue after the PTAB had considered that same issue,
that court at least would find itself needing to acknowledge that a first
mover—the PTAB—already had undertaken to make a decision.
Then, that court either would or would not follow the PTAB
decision—with an explanation inherently comparative in nature, with
the PTAB decision as the baseline.
I have touched on several of the topics that are raised in this
symposium. In the course of doing this, I have given what I hope will
be seen as a very respectful nod to three great presidents of this
country, whose framework and orientation to patent matters, and
respect for patents, I try to keep in my mind whenever I come to
greater and lesser questions about the patent system. The great
people who sought to put into our Constitution provisions that allow
the extension of patent protection to inventors, for all the things they
9. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11) (2012).
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might have done right or wrong in their personal lives—things which
might, if they had been given the light of day, have led to more or less
disgrace of their names—one thing is certainly true: They were
extraordinarily forward-thinking about what might be achieved in our
economy by taking the time to look at intellectual property and the
tremendously beneficial things patents might do for us.
I do not think there is any person who credibly can assert that
the United States has not done well to leverage the creativity of its
people using the recognition and reward system that we have
constructed. That system has helped bring about—or at least has not
prevented—extraordinary levels of innovation operating to the
benefit of the whole planet. It may well be that the patent system
needs improvement, and has within it dysfunction; I doubt there is
anyone who would argue that problems do not exist and that
improvement is not needed. But I think we all can acknowledge that
most of us live today, in this country and in other parts of the world,
in a way that benefits tremendously from innovation arising in this
county. This innovation has no comparison anywhere in the world or
in human history, and it emerged because of how we have harnessed
the energy, willingness, and ability of inventors, so that, within the
system of government and rules we have in place, they continue to
choose to innovate.
Again, thank you for allowing me to say a few words.

